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THE FUTURE OF LAW SCHOOL:
THREE VISIONS AND A PREDICTION
H.W. ARTHURS*
In this article, the author examines three visions of
the future of law schools. The first vision is that they
should focus on producing “practice ready lawyers”
to meet the immediate needs of today’s legal
profession. The second is that law schools should focus
on training “tomorrow’s lawyers,” graduates who are
able to adapt to a rapidly-changing world. The third
insists that law schools are knowledge communities
whose many functions include, but are not limited to,
providing students with a large and liberal
understanding of law that will prepare them for a
variety of legal and non-legal careers and for
participation as citizens in the broader economy and
polity. Although the future of law schools is contested
and uncertain, the author predicts, law schools will be
celebrated in the long term for their distinguished
scholarship, their contributions to the public good, and
their role as agents of change rather than for skills
training, their influence on day-to-day legal practice,
and their purveying of conventional wisdom.
L’auteur de cet article examine trois visions des
écoles de droit de demain. Dans la première, l’école se
concentre sur la production «d’avocats prêts à
pratiquer», c’est-à-dire des avocats répondant aux
besoins immédiats de la profession juridique
d’aujourd’hui. Dans la deuxième, l’école se concentre
sur la formation «d’avocats de demain», c’est-à-dire
des diplômés capables de s’adapter à un monde
changeant constamment. Dans la troisième vision,
l’école devient une communauté de savoir dont les
nombreuses fonctions incluent, sans toutefois s’y
limiter, la prestation aux étudiants d’une
compréhension vaste et libérale du droit les préparant
à des carrières juridiques et non juridiques afin qu’ils
puissent participer en tant que citoyens à une plus
grande scène économique et politique. Bien que
l’avenir des écoles de droit soit contesté et incertain,
l’auteur prédit que ces écoles seront à l’honneur à
long terme pour leur remarquable mission
professorale, leurs contributions au bien public et leur
rôle en tant qu’agent de changement plutôt que pour
leur formation de compétences, leur influence sur la
pratique juridique au jour le jour et leur prestations
d’acquis et de fondés.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
The future of law school depends on many developments that are largely beyond anyone’s
control — developments in political economy, technology, demographics, and society that
are reconfiguring the legal system, the market for professional services, and the structure of
higher education. However, one crucial factor is very much within the control of law schools:
the values they embrace and the way they define their ambitions. How they do so will
determine whether law schools collaborate with or resist, succumb to or transcend, the
powerful forces that I have mentioned. It will determine whom they hire as faculty members
and admit as students, what and how they teach, the standards they use to measure
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1 Task Force on the Canadian Common Law Degree, Final Report, October 2009 (Federation of Law
Societies of Canada, 2009), online: Federation of Law Societies of Canada <http://www.flsc.ca/_
documents/Common-Law-Degree-Report-C%281%29.pdf> [FLSC Final Report]. “[T]he Task Force
proposes a national requirement expressed in terms of competencies in basic skills, awareness of
appropriate ethical values and core legal knowledge that law students can reasonably be expected to
have acquired during the academic component of their education” (ibid at 4). The Task Force
recommendations have now been adopted by the FLSC and by all of Canada’s common law governing
bodies. Law schools must demonstrate that they will be in compliance with the new requirements as of
2015.
2 See Robert J Condlin, “‘Practice Ready Graduates’: A Millennialist Fantasy” (2014), online: Social
Science Research Network <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2316093>.
3 Supra note 1. The FLSC Final Report cites no empirical evidence to support either a critique of the
practice-readiness of current graduates, or its recommendations that all future graduates must possess
specified “competencies.” Presumably it had no such evidence. For a critique of the FLSC Final Report
on this and other grounds, see HW Arthurs, “The Tree of Knowledge / The Axe of Power: Gerald Le
Dain and the Transformation of Canadian Legal Education,” online: (2012) 8:6 Comparative Research
in Law & Political Economy Research Paper Series 25 <http://www.comparativeresearch.net/>; Harry
Arthurs, “‘Valour Rather Than Prudence’: Hard Times and Hard Choices for Canada’s Legal Academy”
(2013) 76:1 Sask L Rev 73. See also Constance Backhouse, “The ‘Approved’ Common Law Degree”
(2009) 3 CLEAR 141, online: Social Science Research Network <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2273748>; Canadian Association of Law Teachers & Canadian Law and Society
Association, “Response to the Consultation Paper of the Task Force on the Canadian Common Law
Degree of the Federation of Law Societies of Canada December 15, 2008” (2009) 3 CLEAR 151.
achievements, and the way they allocate their scarce resources. And crucially, it will
determine how, if at all, law schools exploit their strategic location as producers and
distributors, as conservators and critics, of legal and social knowledge. 
In this article, I present three quite different visions of what law schools ought to be and
do. The first sees their primary, if not their sole, function as producing “practice ready
lawyers” for today’s profession. The second proposes that they should produce “tomorrow’s
lawyers,” lawyers with the capacity to adapt to the rapidly and radically changing
circumstances of legal practice. And the third insists that the leading role played by law
schools in the creation and transformation of legal knowledge, legal practice, and the legal
system requires them to provide their students with a large and liberal understanding of law
which alone will prepare them for a variety of legal and non-legal careers and for
participation as citizens in the broader economy and polity. I conclude by predicting which
vision represents the most likely future of law school. 
II.  VISION 1: TRAINING TODAY’S LAWYERS
I begin with the widely-held view that law schools exist to produce practice ready lawyers.
This view is clearly held by the Federation of Law Societies of Canada (FLSC) and its
member bodies which recently — for the first time ever, but without stated rationale or clear
legal authority — decreed that law schools must ensure that all their graduates are ready to
practice.1 Unfortunately, producing practice ready lawyers is something law schools cannot
do. The problem is that no one knows what practice ready lawyers look like. We lack
information about what legal practitioners do, what knowledge or competencies they actually
need or use, what breadth and depth of knowledge qualify new graduates as “ready” to
practice, or how long they will remain “ready” before what they learned at law school
becomes obsolete.2 These are empirical questions. However, they were neither asked nor
answered before the law societies adopted their new regulations.3 (To its credit, the FLSC
has attempted to subsequently validate its earlier conclusions by conducting a survey of the
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4 See Federation of Law Societies of Canada, National Admission Standards Project: National Entry to
Practice Competency Profile Validation Survey Report (September 2012), online: Federation of Law
Societies of Canada <http://www.flsc.ca/_documents/NASSurveyReportSept2012.pdf>. Amongst the
shortcomings of the Survey are the following: its title suggests that the committee was seeking
confirmation of its conclusions rather than formulating its recommendations in response to the data; the
response rate (17.2 percent of the sample population) was low; the distribution of respondents did not
correspond to the distribution of lawyers across firms, communities, and types of practice; the number
of respondents involved in some types of practice was too small to render their responses statistically
reliable; the selection of a low threshold for usage of the particular knowledge or skill (“once a month
or less”) skews the results towards inclusion of virtually everything; the survey did not probe the nature
or extent of the knowledge needed in given fields (e.g. use of forms versus conceptual knowledge); and,
the aggregation of data, presumably to achieve statistical reliability, conceals potentially important
differences amongst subgroups of respondents.
5 Careful, longitudinal American studies document the extent of specialization, how it varies from one
community to another, and across firm size. See The NALP Foundation for Law Career Research and
Education & American Bar Foundation, After the JD: First Results of a National Study of Legal Careers
(2004), online: American Bar Foundation <http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/docu
ments/ajd.pdf>. Stratification and specialization are also tracked in detail and over time in John P Heinz
& Edward O Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar, revised ed (Evanston, Ill:
Northwestern University Press, 1994); John P Heinz et al, Urban Lawyers: The New Social Structure
of the Bar (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). While Canadian figures may differ somewhat
from those in the United States, the general pattern of specialization and stratification is unlikely to do
so.
6 Some 85,000 persons are now licensed to practice law in Canada. My analysis of all reported discipline
cases in 2011-13 reveals that a total of 23 were disciplined for “incompetence” or “negligence” during
a 30 month period. There were two cases in Alberta (in both of which other professional misconduct
occurred) and two in British Columbia (one of which also involved misrepresentations). In Ontario, there
tasks performed and knowledge used by recent graduates; unfortunately, the survey suffers
from very serious methodological shortcomings.4)
That said, we are virtually certain of one fact about the profession: it is fractured along a
number of deep fault lines.5 Those lines run vertically and divide general practitioners from
specialists, specialists from each other, and both from the remaining one-third of law
graduates who are employed outside the private practice of law, in government agencies,
clinics, or corporate law departments or in non-legal capacities in business, the media, or
politics. No less importantly, in private practice the fault lines run horizontally as well as
vertically: the profession is stratified. As one descends from higher to lower strata, the
clientele tend to become less affluent, the work less complex and more routine, and the
rewards more meagre. For these reasons, as one traverses the grid formed by these
intersecting vertical and horizontal fault lines, it is almost certain that the scope and depth
of what lawyers need to know changes as well. 
If this is true, if indeed what lawyers need to know in order to be practice ready varies
considerably from one kind of practice to another, it is clear that one size of legal education
will not fit all law graduates. But quite inexplicably, Canada’s law societies believe that it
will. They have recently decreed that, to retain their accreditation, all law schools must
ensure that all students acquire all “competencies” and knowledge of all the substantive
subjects or fields specified in their new regulations. For that matter, law societies assume that
not only all new graduates but all established practitioners know the same things. That is
why they allow them to undertake all kinds of work that clients may entrust to them —
murder trials or IPOs, divorces or patent applications. That is why they do not regularly re-
test lawyers to ensure they have kept their law school learning up to date, why they do not
give them qualified licenses that allow them to practice in some fields and not others, and
why they do not, except in very rare circumstances, discipline lawyers for incompetence or
ignorance.6 It is true that all provincial law societies offer programs of continuing education
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were 19 reported cases: 11 involved lawyers who negligently allowed themselves to be duped in
mortgage or real estate frauds; two involved additional acts of professional misconduct; and only six
were straightforward cases of incompetence or negligence. None of these six cases appeared to involve
any of the “competencies” or fields of knowledge in which the law societies have made law school
instruction mandatory. There were no reported cases of discipline for negligence or incompetence in the
other seven provinces.
7 I have reviewed some of these developments and their implications for legal education in a series of
articles: HW Arthurs, “Lawyering in Canada in the 21st Century” (1996) 15 Windsor YB Access Just
202; Harry W Arthurs & Robert Kreklewich, “Law, Legal Institutions, and the Legal Profession in the
New Economy” (1996) 34:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 1; Harry W Arthurs, “Poor Canadian Legal Education:
So Near to Wall Street, So Far from God” (2000) 38:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 381; Harry W Arthurs, “Law
and Learning in an Era of Globalization” (2009) 10:7 German Law Journal 629.
8 CBA Legal Futures Initiative,  The Future of Legal Services in Canada: Trends and Issues (Ottawa:
Canadian Bar Association, 2013), online: CBA Legal Futures Initiative <http://www.cbafutures.org/
CBA/media/mediafiles/PDF/Reports/trends-isssues-eng.pdf?ext=.pdf> [CBA Legal Futures].
9 Ibid at 34.
10 HW Arthurs, “The Political Economy of Canadian Legal Education” (1998) 25:1 JL & Soc’y 14. See
also CBA Legal Futures, supra note 8 at 38.
or professional development, some require participation for a given number of hours per
year, and a few certify specialists on the basis of their extensive experience and/or training.
Nonetheless, to reiterate, the failure of Canada’s law societies to institute regular competence
tests, discipline or disbar incompetent lawyers, or to issue limited licenses to practice speaks
strongly to their willingness to presume all lawyers to be omnicompetent. This presumption,
in turn, is what supports their conclusion that all lawyers must know the same things and
possess the same competencies, a conclusion that totally ignores the effects of specialization
and stratification — the two forces that most powerfully determine what lawyers need to
know in order to practice competently. 
III.  VISION 2: TRAINING TOMORROW’S LAWYERS
Law societies have ignored something else as well: the relentless change that is
destabilizing existing legal institutions, rules, processes, and patterns of practice.7 By
contrast, the Canadian Bar Association in its recent Legal Futures Initiative discussion paper
identifies the drivers of legal change: technology, politics, economics, and demographics.8
We know that family structures, business practices, regulatory technology, forms of property,
patterns of social deviance, and strategies of social control are all in flux. Consequently,
statutes are amended, common law rules mutate, and legal routines and boilerplates change
more frequently and drastically than they used to. The implications for legal education are
important. As the CBA’s discussion paper notes, “[w]ith the speed of change taking place
in the legal environment, choices made at the beginning of a student’s course of study may
be outdated by the time he or she completes all of the necessary requirements for practice”9
— requirements that were set in stone by Canada’s law societies. Some examples of the
connections between social change, professional transformation, and legal education follow.
Over three or four decades, globalization has transformed the production of goods and
services, corporate structures, the international division of labour, the dissemination of
intellectual property and finance capital, and, as a consequence, the norms, modalities and
location of many regimes of corporate governance and regulation. In doing so, globalization
has also dramatically altered the market for legal services, the structure of the law and
consulting firms that deliver those services, the knowledge base of lawyers who advise global
businesses, the content of law school curricula, and the focus of legal scholarship.10 
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11 These developments, and their long-term implications, have been explored by Richard Susskind in a
series of publications. See e.g. Richard Susskind, Transforming the Law: Essays on Technology, Justice
and the Legal Marketplace (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Richard Susskind, The End of
Lawyers? Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Richard
Susskind, Tomorrow's Lawyers: An Introduction to Your Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013).
12 See Michael Ornstein, Racialization and Gender of Lawyers in Ontario (Toronto: The Law Society of
Upper Canada, 2010), online: Law Society of Upper Canada <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/convapril
10_ornstein.pdf>. See also Larry Chartrand et al, “Law Students, Law Schools, and Their Graduates”
(2001) 20 Windsor YB Access Just 211. 
13 See e.g. John Hagan & Fiona Kay, Gender in Practice: A Study of Lawyers’ Lives (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995); Joan Brockman, Gender in the Legal Profession: Fitting or Breaking the Mould
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001).
14 Ornstein reports significant advances in the entry of women, aboriginals, and racialized minorities into
the Ontario legal profession, but also the persistence of status and earning differentials between them
and other lawyers, especially in older age cohorts (supra note 12 at 34). 
15 The situation appears particularly vexed in Ontario. A recent study suggests that in 2011, 91 percent of
law firms did not participate in the profession’s articling program and 10 percent of all graduates (and
15 percent of visible minority graduates) were unable to find articling positions (Avner Levin & Asher
Alkoby, “Barriers to the Profession: Inaction in Ontario, Canada and its Consequences” (2013) 3:3 Oñati
Socio-Legal Series 580). In response, the Law Society of Upper Canada decided to institute (for a three-
Technology has not only enabled globalization, it has had a direct effect on legal practice.
For example, by facilitating the digitization, outsourcing, or offshoring of routine “back-of-
house” functions, technology has allowed large law firms to reduce their complement of
articling students and junior associates which, in turn, has destabilized their business model.
By disseminating legal information online, technology has allowed retail purchasers of
standard legal services to access self-help sites and permitted online service providers to
undercut the lower-tier law firms that formerly delivered such services as part of their core
business. And by enabling electronic searches, technology has not only made legal research
faster and cheaper, it has blurred the boundaries amongst legal categories and between law
and adjacent disciplines. In effect, technology has expanded the bar’s territorial reach and
intellectual horizons while shrinking its control over the market for legal services.11 
Now a brief word about demographics. Like the rest of the Canadian workforce, the legal
profession is not only aging, it is attracting more women and growing more ethnically
diverse.12 These developments have had important implications for the deployment, financial
fortunes, governance, and education of lawyers. For example, diversity has forced large law
firms to embrace meritocracy as a recruitment policy, undermined the image of law as a
“gentleman’s profession,” and generated pressures for greater democracy in the profession’s
governing bodies. Meritocracy has also, ironically, converted law schools into gatekeepers,
whose badges of “merit” largely decide which graduates will, and which will not, gain access
to the most coveted opportunities the profession has to offer. But meritocracy has not
completely won the day. Discrimination and prejudice persist. Many highly qualified women
feel obliged to leave elite firms for jobs in government and corporate law departments where
they find the work environment more supportive.13 And students from immigrant and racial
minority groups, who often confront economic, linguistic, and social barriers before, during,
and after law school, have difficulty finding articling and entry-level jobs and tend to cluster
in disproportionate numbers in small, lower-tier practices or as employees of government and
other institutions.14 These new patterns of recruitment and practice have undermined the bar’s
traditional reliance on informal socialization as a strategy for instilling professional values
in its members. Perhaps this explains why law societies have recently decreed that law
schools must instruct their students in “professionalism,” a project that the profession itself
is no longer willing or able to undertake, underwrite, or even define.15 
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year trial period) a professional training program for students unable to find articles (Articling Task
Force, Final Report, October 25, 2012: Pathways to The Profession: A Roadmap for the Reform of
Lawyer Licensing in Ontario (The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2012), online: The Law Society of
Upper Canada <http://www.lsuc. on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147489848>).
16 The last data-based (if impressionistic) general surveys of the Canadian legal profession are now a
quarter-century old. See HW Arthurs, R Weisman & FH Zemans, “The Canadian Legal Profession”
(1986) 11:3 American Bar Foundation Research Journal 447, revised and republished as Harry W
Arthurs, Richard Weisman & Frederick H Zemans, “Canadian Lawyers: A Peculiar Professionalism”
in Richard L Abel & Philip SC Lewis, eds, Lawyers in Society: The Common Law World (Berkeley,
University of California Press, 1988) 123; David AA Stager & Harry W Arthurs, Lawyers in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990). As noted by the CBA Legal Futures Initiative, “[p]lanning
and decision-making at the industry, firm and individual lawyer levels are hampered by a lack of hard
data on the legal industry in Canada.… Without hard information, key decisions are often made on
anecdotal information or precedent.… As the market share of the industry declines and excess capacity
appears, fact-based decisions will become more and more necessary”(CBA Legal Futures, supra note
8 at 38).
17 CBA Legal Futures, ibid at 34.
18 See e.g. Eliot Freidson, “Theory and the Professions” (1989) 64:3 Ind LJ 423; Herbert M Kritzer, “The
Professions Are Dead, Long Live the Professions: Legal Practice in a Postprofessional World” (1999)
33:3 Law & Soc’y Rev 713. 
I have tried to show how political economy, technology, and demographics have become
drivers of change not only in legal rules and institutions, but in legal practice and ultimately
legal education. However, to reiterate, the profession’s governing bodies have ignored the
challenge of educating lawyers for an uncertain future just as resolutely as they have ignored
the need for hard evidence about how lawyers actually practice in a multi-dimensional
present.16 One thing is certain, however: making graduating students tick all the boxes on an
arbitrary list of competencies and fields of substantive law is no way to ensure that they will
be practice ready today, much less that they will stay that way for the rest of their careers.
By contrast, the CBA’s discussion paper addresses the implications of its findings about legal
change for law schools, albeit somewhat tentatively. It suggests that “[l]aw faculties should
continue to play an important role in teaching the theory of law, legal principles and legal
reasoning” and “[w]hile some observers would have them place increased emphasis on the
practice of law, law schools in their current form may not be the best option for providing
practice training.”17 This suggestion that law schools should focus on “theory…, principles…
and reasoning,” this scepticism about their role in “practice training,” is in part intended to
ensure that law graduates have the intellectual tools they need to adapt to the changing, but
unpredictable, requirements of legal and other careers. But in part it represents a strong hint
that by focusing on what they do best, law schools can make their greatest contribution to the
profession.
IV.  VISION 3: THE LAW SCHOOL AS A KNOWLEDGE COMMUNITY 
What do they do best? Law schools are knowledge communities: they exist to collect,
critique, produce, and disseminate knowledge. We therefore need briefly to consider what
we mean by knowledge in the context of law. Obviously the profession is (or should be) as
concerned about knowledge as the academy. After all, its monopoly over legal practice rests
(somewhat tenuously) on the claim that lawyers know things that other people do not.18
However, the profession and the academy relate to “knowledge” differently. Practitioners
tend to consume knowledge while academics produce it. Practitioners tend to know what
they need to know while academics know what they want to know. Practitioners tend to treat
knowledge as a given while academics treat it as contingent, as being constantly revised by
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19 CBA Legal Futures, supra note 8 at 30.
new evidence, new methodologies, new theories, and new ways of knowing. Practitioners
and academics both need to master non-legal domains of knowledge, but many practitioners
are reluctant to admit this, while most academics celebrate interdisciplinarity. And finally,
practitioners especially value tacit knowledge, practical knowledge that is gained through
experience, disseminated through mentorship, and deployed in response to instinct or reflex,
while academics prize explicit knowledge, knowledge that can be systematized, taught,
published, and challenged. 
It is easy to see, then, that disagreements between the academy and the profession about
the nature of knowledge are at the root of disagreements over who should control law schools
— the profession’s governing bodies or the universities and their law faculties. The future
of law schools, I argue, and the future of law as a profession, social institution, and
intellectual discipline, depends on who controls knowledge. Law schools cannot function
well as knowledge communities if their view of knowledge is disparaged, marginalized, or
suppressed because it conflicts with that of the profession; if legal orthodoxy has a privileged
place on the curriculum and a pre-emptive claim on resources; if critical scholarship and
transformative pedagogy are seen as illicit attempts to subvert professionalism; or if research,
graduate studies, and public advocacy come to be seen as derogating from the “true” or
“core” mission of law schools or as mere decorative appendages to it. 
How should the academy use its freedom to collect, critique, produce, and disseminate
knowledge in a world that is in flux, in a legal universe that is increasingly chaotic? First, it
is the academy’s job to make sense of it all. The academy should therefore chronicle change,
identify continuities and discontinuities, demonstrate causes and effects, and explain whose
interests and which values are being advanced or attacked. And the academy should wrestle
with change. It should advocate for change intelligently when it deserves support and fiercely
resist change when it does not. This requires not just intervention at the level of high
principle, but practical work such as proposals for new legislation, the conjuring up of new
doctrines, and the invention of new instruments of private governance. Moreover, in its
engagement with change, the academy must not only chronicle and wrestle with change. It
must equip its students — the future architects and artisans of legal change — with the tools
and skills they need to implement or respond to change. And finally, as the CBA discussion
paper suggests, legal practitioners and policy makers, no less than legal scholars and
students, will have to venture into new domains of theoretical and practical knowledge.19
Law schools are obvious candidates to lead the way. Academics in adjacent disciplines,
experts in government agencies and private consultancies, and leaders in business and social
movements all have a great deal to tell us. To engage these “relevant others” in meaningful
conversations, lawyers old and new, academic and practicing, must learn to talk to them in
their own vernacular. Because knowledge is their special concern, law schools will face their
biggest challenge, and can make their greatest contribution, as interpreters and
intermediaries, as experts in integrating law-talk with other discourses. 
Putting change at the centre of what they do will be hard for law schools — especially
with regard to their lawyer training functions. However, they have already made a good start.
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20 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “On Thinking Like A Lawyer” Harvard Law Today (May 2002), online:
Princeton University  <http://www.princeton.edu/~slaughtr/Commentary/On%20Thinking%20Like%
20a%20Lawyer.pdf>.
21 The debate centres on the tension between techniques of formal legal argumentation and the cultural and
political assumptions embedded in them. For recent contributions see Elizabeth Mertz, The Language
of Law School: Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer” (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007);
Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 2009).
First, law schools have generally abandoned the notion that legal education is only about
teaching legal rules. Instead, law schools generally aim to train students to “think like
lawyers” — to develop generic analytical and critical skills that can be deployed over time
and across a wide variety of legal and non-legal contexts. This is certainly better than
insisting, as law societies perversely do, that all lawyers must know the same things. But the
current strategy is still somewhat problematic. Perhaps, like pornography, we can recognize
“law think” when we see it. However, there is little empirical evidence that all lawyers think
alike, that they analyze legal problems in similar fashion, that “law think” necessarily
occupies a significant part of their working days, or that lawyers think differently from social
workers, literary critics, or corporate executives. Indeed, within legal academic circles, there
is a robust debate about what it means to “think like a lawyer.” One distinguished legal
scholar has recently argued that “[t]hinking like a lawyer is thinking like a human being, a
human being who is tolerant, sophisticated, pragmatic, critical, and engaged.”20 On the other
hand, an extensive literature argues to the contrary, that thinking like a lawyer involves a
distinctive repertoire of analytical and discursive strategies.21 But whichever position one
favours, it is important to remember that lawyers who cannot, will not, or do not also think
like human beings are quite likely to harm themselves, their clients, the reputation of the bar,
and the effectiveness of the legal system. 
This leads me to a second strategy — interdisciplinarity — which law schools have been
preaching for decades, and sometimes actually practice. Interdisciplinarity takes many forms:
joint degree programs, the cross-appointment of scholars from other disciplines to teach law
school courses, so-called “law and…” or “perspective” courses and, most commonly,
casebook and classroom references to economic, political, sociological, philosophical, and
historical perspectives on legal issues. Interdisciplinary teaching is difficult: many law
professors are not well-trained or well-read in other disciplines; appropriate materials are
sometimes hard to come by; and students are often resistant. However, as I have suggested,
most legal academics are convinced that interdisciplinarity is an essential element of the
response to change: it shakes lawyers loose from the notion that law is unchanging and
unchangeable, it gets them into the habit of thinking outside the legal box, and it helps them
better understand just what is in that box. Interdisciplinarity, depending on one’s point of
view, is either a complement or a corrective to thinking like a lawyer. 
 
A third, related strategy, long ago adopted by law schools, but still resisted by the
profession, is the optional curriculum which, apart from a few introductory or foundational
courses, allows students to decide what they wish to study. Optionalization is meant to
engage students intellectually and, at the same time, to help them to prepare for varied and
unpredictable futures. There is not much downside to the optional curriculum. If law schools
are primarily teaching students how to think, one subject will serve as well as another. And
in fact, the optional curriculum has distinct advantages. Students with different interests and
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career aspirations will sensibly want to study subjects that advance those aspirations.
Consequently, optionalization enhances motivation. And there is another advantage: if
graduates are going to have to educate themselves during their future careers, in order to
adapt to a changing society, economy, and legal system, they must learn to learn. If the
optional curriculum is properly structured, it will involve higher level, interdisciplinary,
experiential, and capstone courses, as well as research and writing requirements.22 Such
learning experiences — rather than the Socratic or lecture methods of instruction traditionally
used in “core” courses — will help students develop their critical intelligence and their
integrative skills, both of which will enable them in later years to seek out and assimilate new
ideas and information. And one further point: the optional curriculum gives scholar-teachers
an opportunity to use their classroom or seminar room as a testing ground for new ideas and
as a conduit for disseminating those ideas to future generations of practitioners and policy
makers. Consequently, it is an important vehicle for the renewal of the legal profession and
the justice system. 
Law schools are increasingly committed to one more important strategy: experiential
learning.23 They believe that immersing students in real or simulated legal situations has
several advantages. Like the optional curriculum, experiential learning enhances motivation.
It exposes students to certain intractable facts of legal life — the legal power of deep pockets,
the anguish of clients caught up in a system they do not understand, the stultifying effects of
déformation professionelle. This exposure can incite students to think critically and
systemically, as well as analytically, and convey powerful normative lessons, but is difficult
to achieve through conventional course materials and teaching methods. Still, I must add a
note of caution: there is a risk that experiential learning can degenerate into mere skills
training. Obviously, if students do learn something about negotiation or counselling or
advocacy, that is a good thing. However, experiential learning is not simply to show students
how to put “law-think” to practical use; it is to enable them to confront the normative,
logistical, and relational issues that are immanent in all legal encounters. In this sense, the
success of experiential learning depends ultimately on the strength of law schools as
knowledge communities, on their ability to provide students with context and perspective that
allow them to make sense of what they have observed or experienced.
The future of law schools, then, is to embrace their vocation as knowledge communities,
to embed their JD and other educational programs within their larger mandate of aggregating,
critiquing, and disseminating knowledge, and to pay attention to the challenge of rapid and
profound changes in society and in law. I have identified four useful strategies that they have
adopted to teach students to think like lawyers, to contextualize and critically evaluate their
legal experiences, to adapt to change, and, especially, to learn how to learn. 
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But is this enough? If law graduates have not mastered the practical competencies and
specific bodies of substantive law prescribed by Canada’s law societies, will they pose a risk
to their clients, their colleagues, and their liability insurers? I doubt it. Indeed, there are good
reasons to believe the contrary. None of the iconic architects of the English legal system,
none of today’s judges of the Supreme Court of Canada, and none of the members of the
profession’s governing bodies had legal educations that conformed to the law societies’
prescriptions. Indeed, some of them had educations that could only be described as
rudimentary, but they are revered. Many leading practitioners and academics never took
courses in the specialized fields of law where they make their reputations, some of which
(such as the Charter24) did not exist when they were law students. Most skilled advocates,
draftspersons, counsellors, and negotiators learned their trade on the job because mentors
took the time to teach them. Evidence from the United States makes this amply clear.
Graduates of leading law schools that prize scholarship, offer wide-open curricula, and
emphasize thinking skills, theory, and interdisciplinarity, fare relatively well even in today’s
difficult legal labour market. They are far more likely to be hired (and for better jobs) than
graduates of the other sort of schools, those whose faculty do not publish and whose
curricula emphasize “basics” and “preparation for practice.”25 Likewise, the large consulting
firms that compete successfully with law firms in many key markets tend to hire people on
the basis of their intellectual abilities, not their professional “competencies.”26
Nor should any of this be surprising: in most labour markets today, sophisticated and
adaptable knowledge-workers with generic capabilities tend to fare much better than semi-
skilled workers with a limited repertoire of skills and know-how closely aligned to the
current modus operandi of particular employers or trades. Indeed, studies of labour markets
emphasize their polarization — the emergence of a privileged class of knowledge-workers
in good jobs is paralleled by significant growth in employment in bad jobs in the service
sector.27 Although the analogy is far from perfect, it is possible to predict parallel
developments in the market for legal services. Graduates of elite schools, with a broad array
of intellectual skills, will continue to occupy privileged positions in elite firms and
government and corporate law departments; “semi-skilled” general practitioners with
workaday command of legal “basics” and routines will increasingly experience loss of
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market share, income, and professional influence; a new class of relatively low-paid legal
service workers — paralegals — will emerge to perform much of the work formerly done by
general practitioners. Indeed, it is possible to read Ontario’s recent conscription of paralegals
as members of the Law Society as a pre-emptive move by the bar to extend its regulatory
reach over the new “legal service providers” who threaten the interests of its traditional core
constituency of small firms and solo practitioners.28
What would such a reconfigured legal labour market imply for the future of law schools?
If my original description of the legal profession as divided by deep fault lines is anywhere
near accurate, and if those fault lines are likely to proliferate with the emergence of
paralegals as an additional constituency within the profession, there will be strong pressures
to ensure that each element of the profession is properly prepared for the unique tasks that
it undertakes, much as in the medical profession. However, this can only be accomplished
if this new system of educational credentials is explicitly linked to a new system of
professional licensure, so that the scope of practice of each licensee is restricted to the areas
in which she or he has received education and training. For example, general practitioners
may one day be licensed to appear as advocates in certain tribunals and the lower courts, to
execute routine real estate transactions and simple incorporations, and to process uncontested
divorces, but not to undertake, say, appellate litigation, patent applications, tax planning, or
other specialized tasks. Of course, the classes of membership would likely not be watertight:
licensees in two or more classes might be eligible to perform some types of legal work; and
members of each class would likely have the chance to requalify and enter a higher class. 
If such a system of licensing were adopted — and the licensing of paralegals suggests that
it may be — the future of law schools might look quite different from the one I have
proposed. They might offer a skills-based one-year degree for paralegals, a stripped-down
two-year “basic” degree for general practitioners, an enhanced four-year degree for specialist
practitioners, and conversion courses for those who want to upgrade their credentials. This
model has certain attractions: it would save time and money for those who wish to enter
general practice, despite its declining prospects; it would ensure that legal specialists possess
the theoretical, analytical, and contextual sophistication required to deal with complex and
multidimensional issues; and it would enable law schools and other education providers to
customize their curricula to fit the diverse needs of their students. These are definite
advantages, but there are risks as well. A clear division between faculty members who teach
“basics” to paralegals and general practitioners, and those who teach future legal specialists,
intellectuals, and policy advisors is likely to engender squabbles over the soul of law schools,
or at least over their budgets. There are risks for students too: stripping the generalist
program down to “basics” might foreshorten the horizons and stunt the ambitions of the
students enrolled in it. And there are risks for the profession: a system of limited licenses
would force it not only to abandon the rhetoric of lawyers’ omnicompetence, but to revisit
policies and practices based on that rhetoric including the structures of professional
governance, the code of professional conduct, the requirements for continuing education, and
the provision of errors and omissions insurance. 
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However, the risks are minimal. Law schools will not be redesigned to support a system
of multiple professional credentials, because the profession is very unlikely to adopt such a
system. At least for the foreseeable future, there will be only one proper professional
credential — barrister and solicitor, and only one main route to obtaining that credential —
via an “approved” J.D. degree, one that ticks all the boxes specified in the new law society
regulations. However, it will be difficult to tick those boxes if law schools remain true to
their character as knowledge communities, if they persevere with scholarship, law reform,
public advocacy, and graduate studies, and if they insist on giving J.D. students a liberal
education in law. Law schools will somehow have to square this circle. They will either have
to challenge the new regulations directly, or feign compliance and hope that no one notices.
If they do neither, there will be more and more boxes to tick and less and less opportunity
to do all the other things law schools should be doing.29
V.  CONCLUSION
The future of law schools is uncertain: the social, political, and intellectual forces that
shape law, legal practice, and legal education are in flux. Their future is contested; the
academy and the profession are fundamentally at odds over the nature of knowledge, the best
way to educate lawyers, and many other matters. And their future is plural: different law
schools will have different futures. Nonetheless, I will venture a prediction. When this law
school celebrates its bicentenary in 2113,30 when speakers look back on its second century
of accomplishment, they will mention distinguished scholarship more often than skills
training, they will mention its long-term contributions to the public good more often than its
immediate influence on present-day legal practice, and they will mention its role as an agent
of change more often than its role as a faithful purveyor of conventional wisdom. 
 
Taking the long view and focusing on change will seem like typical academic self-
indulgence to those whose job it is to ensure that the public receives high quality professional
services in the here and now. Describing law schools as multifunctional knowledge
communities rather than institutions single-mindedly devoted to the training of practice ready
lawyers will seem like callous indifference to the plight of students and recent graduates who
face mounting debts and declining job opportunities. And my apparent downgrading of “hard
law” and “how to” courses, and my privileging of theory and thinking, of interdisciplinarity
and contextualization, will appall at least a few of my academic colleagues. To all of the
above I apologize if, as they say, I have inadvertently given offence. But I am willing to bet
that when the time capsule is opened 100 years hence, when someone removes the crumbling
copy of my remarks and matches them against the historical record, I will turn out to have
been right. And not only right, but helpful to those charged with upholding professional
standards, prescient in my advice as to what kind of education will help students survive and
flourish in volatile legal labour markets, and so modest in my prescriptions for reforming the
law curriculum as to seem hopelessly conservative to my academic heirs and assigns.
